Keeping airport sales going through a ransomware attack

Branches:
Retail
Imagine you're responsible for the technology in a chain of airport stores. Tens of thousands of travellers pass through every day. Then, early one morning in January, the network goes down.
No sales data. No shift plans. No laptops. Just a ransom note.
That is what happened to Travel Retail Norway (TRN), which operates the duty-free and Travel Value stores at Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and Trondheim airports.A ransomware attack had taken its back-office systems offline. Onitio's role was to establish whether the attack had reached the checkout system and help contain the threat.
What happens when your systems go dark?
TRN runs three brands: Tax Free Norway, Travel Value Norway, and Travel Value Fashion Norway. Its highest-turnover store sits in arrivals at Oslo Airport, and around 60,000 travellers pass through it every day.
At 05:34 on Tuesday 23 January 2024, store staff noticed that the network was down. By 08:30, a ransom note from a group calling itself Akira had been found on a server: “Hi friends… Your internal infrastructure is fully or partially dead. All backups removed.”
Almost every digital tool that TRN’s 1,000 employees relied on stopped working. Laptops were unusable, staff schedules were gone, self-checkout was offline, and nobody could access documents or internal messaging. Only the staffed tills, payment terminals, and employees’ mobile phones still worked.
Prices were frozen, and without access to sales data, the money arriving in TRN’s bank account was the only indication of how the day was going.
TRN instructed all employees to switch off their computers, notified the Norwegian Data Protection Authority, and assembled an emergency response team. For a retailer that trades from the first flight to the last, one question came before everything else: had the attackers reached the checkout system too?
"In the early phase of the cyberattack, when the situation was marked by uncertainty and chaos, it was reassuring to have Onitio as a trusted partner. They did everything they could to ensure that sales in our stores could continue as normal. Onitio demonstrated great flexibility and decisiveness and were a key source of reassurance in a very demanding time." Linda Brenden, Head of Digital, Travel Retail Norway
Protecting the checkout system
TRN contacted us soon after discovering the attack. Onitio already supported TRN’s store systems, so we could quickly start gathering information across the retail environment. In those first hours, we focused on understanding how far the attack had spread and what TRN needed to keep its stores operating.
Our first priority was the checkout system. It runs on a separate network, and our investigation found no evidence that the attackers had compromised it. That finding gave TRN the confidence to keep trading.
Once we knew which group was behind the attack, we could look for known indicators of compromise associated with Akira. We found traces of the attack on endpoints and identified an affected account in TRN’s domain, which we quickly isolated. We also checked communication logs for connections to addresses linked to the group.
Our findings indicated that the attack primarily affected TRN’s administrative systems. We shared the evidence with TRN’s crisis team to support its investigation and help build a clearer picture of what had happened.
Over the following days, we focused on reducing the risk of further compromise. We deployed WithSecure endpoint detection and response (EDR) across the servers and endpoints supporting sales and customer communication, and brought them under 24/7 monitoring from our security operations centre (SOC). We also reconfigured the checkout system so it could operate independently of the affected domain.
We increased monitoring of the checkout system and network communication, rerouted traffic where necessary, and analysed every log in depth for further signs of compromise.
Meanwhile, TRN kept its stores trading without its systems. Staff operated self-checkout manually and coordinated using their phones. The management and IT teams met twice a day, while the CEO updated the whole company every week.
The attack also prompted TRN to reconsider which systems it actually needed. Rather than restore the old infrastructure, TRN chose to rebuild its IT environment from scratch in Microsoft Azure and leave some applications behind. Every system it chose not to restore meant one less system to maintain, update, and protect.
Results
- The stores never stopped trading. The checkout system ran on a separate network,we found no evidence it had been compromised, and payments continued throughout.
- The attack stayed inside TRN’s administrative systems and never reached the checkout system. We isolated the affected account.
- TRN came out of the incident with EDR across the servers and endpoints behind sales and customer communication, 24/7 SOC monitoring, and a checkout system no longer dependent on the affected domain.
- TRN’s digital sales services, click-and-collect, and customer communication resumed with minimal risk, and financial and product reporting followed once the forensic work and risk assessment were complete.
On 2 February, ten days after the attack, employees received another ransom note, this time by email across the company. No further threats or contact followed, and the investigation found no confirmed evidence of data exfiltration. That was the last TRN heard from Akira.
